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 “Trade, of course, is neither inherently good nor bad; but 






known	 as	 the	North	American	Agreement	 on	Environmental	
Cooperation	 (“NAAEC”),	 provides	 a	mechanism	 for	 citizens	
to	aim	the	international	spotlight	on	a	government’s	failure	to	
enforce	 domestic	 environmental	 laws.3	 A	 similar	 agreement	
between	Chile	 and	Canada,	 the	Canada-Chile	Agreement	 on	
Environmental	Cooperation	(“CCAEC”),	allows	ordinary	citi-
zens	 to	 ask	 an	 international	 body	 to	 investigate	 alleged	non-
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws.4	While	 these	mechanisms	
are	 commonplace	 in	 a	 number	
of	 international	 trade	 agree-






As	 the	 international	 com-
munity	 turns	 its	 attention	 to	
environmental	 crises	 around	









mechanisms	 under	 the	CCAEC,	NAAEC,	 and	 the	USCFTA.	

























Committee,	 and	 a	 Joint	 Pub-
lic	 Advisory	 Committee.10	 A	
citizen	 submission	 to	 the	CEC	
must	meet	seven	largely	proce-
dural	 criteria	 and	be	grounded	
in	 a	 specific	 incident	 of	 non-















The United States must 
decide how to address 
lax enforcement of 













the	 parties	 convene	 a	 meeting	
of	 the	 Commission	 to	 resolve	





the	 non-enforcing	 party.22	 The	
complaining	party	 can	 suspend	
USCFTA	 trade	 benefits	 if	 the	
party	fails	to	pay	the	fine.23	
analysIs
effective enforcement of environmental lawS 
protect the environment, human health, anD 
foreign inveStment StreamS

















State-to-State DiSpute reSolution alone DoeS 
not increaSe enforcement of environmental lawS
While	 state-to-state	 dispute	 resolution	 theoretically	 pro-
vides	a	venue	for	environmental	advocates	to	work	though	their	



















same	 time,	 the	 consequences	
of	state-to-state	dispute	resolu-
tion	are	 trade	sanctions,	which	
undermine	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	
agreement:	 free	 trade.35	 As	 a	
result,	 no	 party	 has	 used	 the	
NAAEC	 or	 CCAEC	 govern-























a citizen enforcement proceDure iS a better 
mechaniSm for increaSing enforcement of 
environmental lawS anD promoting public 
intereSt in the environment
A	citizen	enforcement	mechanism	strikes	a	balance	between	







No state party has used 
the state-to-state dispute 
resolution procedures










Citizens	 can	 directly	 observe	
environmental	 violations	 and	
a	 lack	 of	 state	 action	 in	 their	
neighborhoods.51	 In	 contrast,	
limited	 resources	 restrict	 state	
































free	 trade	 agreement	while	 providing	 consequences	 for	 non-












organizations	 in	 more	 devel-




zations	 foster	 the	 development	
of	 the	 environmental	 commu-
nity,	 strengthening	 domestic	
environmental	 protections	 as	




ernment	 to	 take	 any	 action.66	
However,	even	a	limited	citizen	












incluDe a citizen SubmiSSion on enforcement 
mechaniSm in future free traDe agreementS










knowledge	of	 citizens	 to	 identify	 instances	of	 environmental	
non-enforcement.69	 State	 interests	 in	 preserving	 sovereignty	
would	likely	limit	any	effort	for	states	to	monitor	each	others’	
domestic	environmental	enforcement.70	A	citizen	enforcement	
mechanism	balances	 the	public	 interest	 in	consistent	enforce-
ment	and	the	state	interest	in	sovereignty.	
Because citizen 
submissions do not rely 
on government action, 
countries cannot subsume 


















Do not enact free traDe 
agreementS with StateS 




process	 can	 increase	 effective	
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws,	 increased	enforcement	of	
laws	 that	 do	 not	 exist	 cannot	
protect	the	environment.	While	
some	argue	that	free	trade	brings	
increased	 prosperity	 that	 will	
in	 turn	 increase	 environmental	
protections,	 investor	protection	
provisions	 in	 free	 trade	 agree-
ments	are	a	threat	to	new	envi-
ronmental	laws.75	Because	of	these	















While	 inclusion	of	 any	 environmental	 provisions	 in	 free	
trade	 agreements	 is	 a	 step	 forward,	 lip	 service	 to	 increased	
enforcement	of	environmental	laws	is	not	sufficient.	Effective	
enforcement	of	domestic	environmental	laws	should	be	a	stan-
dard	 condition	 of	 future	 U.S.	
free	trade	agreements.	Allowing	
state-to-state	dispute	 resolution	
on	 environmental	 issues	 is	 not	
sufficient	 to	 actually	 increase	
enforcement	 because	 states	
tend	 to	 rely	 on	 mutual	 non-
enforcement	when	 there	are	no	
other	 consequences.	 A	 citizen	
submission	on	enforcement	pro-
cess	 is	much	more	 effective	 at	
increasing	enforcement	because	
it	 takes	advantage	of,	and	even	
increases,	 public	 awareness	 of	
non-enforcement.	While	 a	 citi-
zen	 enforcement	 process	 alone	
will	not	solve	the	world’s	envi-
ronmental	 problems,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 step	 towards	 increas-
ing	 government	 accountability	 for	 effective	 enforcement	 of	
environmental	laws.	
Effective environmental 
laws must be in place 
before a free trade 
agreement can improve 
their enforcement
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Canada	and	the	United	States	continued on page 91
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